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Abstract - Rainbow tables reduce the difficulty in brute force 
cracking a single password by creating a large pre-generated 
data set of hashes from nearly every possible password 
Rainbow Tables. This method, known as the Faster Time-
Memory Trade-off Technique, is based on research by Martin 
Hellman & Ronald Rivest done in the early 1980’s on the 
performance trade-offs between processing time and the 
memory needed for cryptanalysis. In this paper we review 
some of the most important works in rainbow table generation 
and using rainbow tables in window NT environment, i.e. 
against NTLM. We will discuss how NTLM is weak against 
rainbow table attacks. 
Keywords : brute force attack, LM, NTLM, rainbow 
tables and cryptanalysis. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
AN Manager [1], or LM, is an authentication protocol 
designed (at its time) to maximize password 
security in a Windows-based environment. The LM 
protocol was first used in Microsoft's LAN Manager 
Product a very long time ago and is still the 
authentication protocol of choice for older operating 
systems, such as Windows 95 and Windows NT 3.51 
and earlier. Later, when Windows NT was introduced, 
LM was enhanced and renamed the NTLM [2] 
authentication protocol. Although NTLM has been 
around for a long time, it's still a basically good 
authentication protocol, and it is the native network 
authentication protocol of Windows NT 4.0 and earlier 
operating systems. 
a) NTLM Major Weaknesses [3] 
• SAM has several vulnerabilities, which allowed 
attackers to access the hashed passwords. 
• NTLM can use a maximum of 14 characters to 
create its stored hash. These 14 characters are split 
into two seven-character strings. Crypto-graphically, 
it is reasonably easy to brute force attack [8] two 
seven-character strings with modern computers. 
• NTLM cannot use lowercase letters. It converts all 
lowercase letters to uppercase before creating the 
hash. This reduces the character set for the 
password, making brute force attacks far more likely 
to succeed. 
• The hash algorithm used to store passwords 
became   well   known.  That   allowed   attackers   to  
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guess users' passwords by running password 
guesses through the hash until the result matched 
the result stored in the SAM. Because the algorithm 
remained constant, large libraries of hashed 
passwords could be stored and used to quickly 
attack a SAM. 
• NTLM used a mechanism known as pass-through 
authentication to distribute the authentication task. 
The way pass-through authentication was designed 
created a bottleneck at the primary domain 
controller (PDC) of each domain. Some of the tasks 
done by the PDC, such as password changes, 
could not be offloaded to any other server. 
• Attackers began accessing passwords by 
pretending to be trusted servers. Users' client 
computers would transmit logon information to the 
attackers, thinking that they were domain controllers 
or file servers. NTLM provided no way for users to 
verify that the server they were connecting to be the 
one they intended to connect to. 
• NTLM was largely limited to interoperability with 
Microsoft products. As computer networks became 
more heterogeneous, NTLM didn't provide a way to 
interoperate with non-Microsoft operating systems. 
• NTLM provided no way for a middle-tier application 
to access resources on a user's behalf. When a 
user's client application accessed a middle-tier 
application, the middle-tier application usually used 
a generic administrator credential to access 
backend resources. This technique works, but 
presents a security threat, because the middle-tier 
application is running under powerful security 
credentials. 
II. Rainbow Tables 
A rainbow table [5]  is a way of doing 
cryptanalysis very quickly and efficiently.  Suppose that 
you are a hacker and you have acquired a database of 
usernames and encrypted passwords. The System 
encodes the password using a hash function, which is 
basically a way of condensing a given set of data into a 
condensed string.  For example, the MD5 algorithm 
encrypts password “MyPassword” as 48503dfd58-
720bd5f-f35c102065a52d7 if one, as a hacker, have the 
password described above, one wouldn’t know what the 
password is just by looking.  Instead, one would refer to 
the rainbow table for the password. Rainbow tables are 
a pre-computation based approach to reversing hashes. 
L 
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They require a large amount of pre-
computation, but can store the results of this in a 
reasonable amount of space. When searching for a 
hash, additional computation is required, but the 
computation required for searching is significantly less 
than the amount required for the pre-computation, and 
significantly less than the amount required to brute force 
[3] a password. 
By generating long chains of passwords and 
hashes, tied together by the hash function and a 
reduction function, rainbow tables store a compressed 
representation of a password search space. By 
performing similar computations on a provided hash, 
they are able to dramatically reduce the amount of 
computation required to find the original password. As 
with many algorithms, there are limitations with rainbow 
tables. Unlike a brute force algorithm, they are not 
guaranteed to find a password within the search space, 
as the algorithm is probabilistic in the coverage of the 
password space, and a password will only be found if it 
is represented in the generated tables. However, very 
high success probabilities can be achieved, and the 
search time is significantly less than with a brute force 
algorithm.  
The crack time/storage space tradeoff of 
rainbow tables is adjusted by changing the chain length. 
Longer chains require less storage space, but require 
more computation (and more time) to crack passwords. 
a) Related Works 
MARTIN E. HELLMAN, [4], in “A Cryptanalytic 
Time - Memory Trade-Off”, describes that A probabilistic 
method is presented which crypt analyzes any N key 
cryptosystem in N2/3 operations with N2/3 words of 
memory (average values) after a precomputation which 
requires N operations. If the precomputation can be 
performed in a reasonable time period (e.g. several 
years), the additional computation required recovering 
each key compares very favorably with the N operations 
required by an exhaustive search and the N words of 
memory required by table lookup. When applied to the 
Data Encryption Standard (DES) used in block mode. It 
Indicate that solutions should cost between $1 and $100 
each. The method Works in a chosen plain text attack 
and, if cipher block chaining is not used, can also be 
used in a cipher text-only attack. 
The time-memory trade-off was described for 
use with a block cipher, but the same approach works 
with a synchronous stream cipher. The first k bits of key 
stream are taken as the f (K) function, where k is the 
number of bits of key. This can be done under a known 
plaintext attack. The method works on all systems in a 
chosen plaintext attack but does not work with a known 
plaintext attack on a cipher feedback system if the initial 
load of the shift register is random and varies between 
conversations. 
Proposed Federal standards suggest this 
precaution. Even a block cipher can foil the time-
memory trade-off in a known plaintext attack through 
cipher block chaining or other techniques which 
introduce memory into the encipherment. Then, even 
when eight blanks occur in the plaintext, their 
encipherment depends on the preceding text. Even if 
the first block of text is fairly standard (e.g., “Login: “), 
this technique can be foiled by the transmission of a 
random “indicator” which is used to affect the 
encipherment (e.g., it is taken as the 0th plaintext block).  
Again, proposed standards include provision for cipher 
block chaining with a random indicator. While this time-
memory trade-off cryptanalytic technique can be easily 
foiled, it does work on   the DES in basic block mode, 
more importantly; it indicates that even when cipher 
block chaining or other techniques are added, a larger 
key size is needed to have a reasonable assurance of 
security.  
While table lookup and exhaustive search are 
currently infeasible on systems with 64-bit or larger key 
sizes, an N1/2 time-memory trade-off would push the 
minimum usable key size up to 128 bits. The N2/3 
technique described   here, coupled with the large 
number of N1/2 time-memory tradeoffs known for other 
searching problems, indicates that valuable data should 
not be entrusted to a device with smaller key size. 
Philippe Oechslin, [5], in “Making a Faster 
Cryptanalytic Time-Memory Trade Off”, describes that In 
1980 Martin Hellman described a cryptanalytic time-
memory trade-off which reduces the time of 
cryptanalysis by using precalculated data stored in 
memory. This technique was improved by Rivest before 
1982 with the introduction of distinguished points which 
drastically reduces the number of memory lookups 
during cryptanalysis. This improved technique has been 
studied extensively but no new optimizations have been 
published ever since. The Authors proposed a new way 
of precalculating the data which reduces by two the 
number of calculations needed during cryptanalysis. 
Moreover, since the method does not make use of 
distinguished points, it reduces the overhead due to the 
variable chain length, which again significantly reduces 
the number of calculations. As an example, the authors 
have implemented an attack on MS-Windows password 
hashes. Using 1.4GB of data Attacker can crack 99.9% 
of all alphanumerical passwords hashes (237) in 13.6 
seconds whereas it takes 101 seconds with the current 
approach using distinguished points. The Authors 
showed that the gain could be even much higher 
depending on the parameters used and they have 
introduced a new way of generating precomputed data 
in Hellman’s original cryptanalytic time-memory trade-
off. Our optimization has the same property as the use 
of distinguished points, namely that it reduces the 
number of table look-ups by a factor which is equal to 
the length of the chains. For an equivalent success rate 
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our method reduces the number of calculations needed 
for cryptanalysis by a factor of two against the original 
method and by an even more important factor (12 in our 
experiment) against distinguished points. 
The Authors showed that the reason for this 
extra gain is the variable length of chains that are 
delimited by distinguished points which results in more 
false alarms and more overhead per false alarm.  
They conjecture that with different parameters 
the gain could be even much larger than the factor of 12 
found in our experiment. These facts make our method 
a very attractive replacement for the original method 
improved with distinguished points. 
The fact that their method yields chains that 
have a constant length also greatly simplifies the 
analysis of the method as compared to variable length 
chains using distinguished points. It also avoids the 
extra precalculation effort which occurs when variable 
length chains have to be discarded because they have 
an inappropriate length or contain a loop. Constant 
length could even prove to be advantageous for 
hardware implementations. Finally their experiment has 
demonstrated that the time-memory trade-off allows 
anybody owning a modern personal computer to break 
cryptographic systems which were believed to be 
secure when implemented years ago and which are still 
in use today. This goes to demonstrate the importance 
of phasing out old cryptographic systems when better 
systems exist to replace them. In particular, since 
memory has the same importance as processing speed 
for this type of attack, typical workstations benefit doubly 
from the progress of technology. 
Hans Hedbom, et al [6], in “A Comparison of the 
Security of Windows NT and UNIX”, describes that this 
paper presents a brief comparison of two operating 
systems, Windows NT and UNIX. The comparison 
covers two different aspects. First, we compare the main 
security features of the two operating systems and then 
we make a comparison of a selection of vulnerabilities 
most of which we know have been used for making real 
intrusions.  
The Authors found that Windows NT has slightly 
more rigorous security features than “standard” UNIX 
but the two systems display similar vulnerabilities. The 
conclusion is that there are no significant differences in 
the “real” level of security between these systems. 
This paper demonstrates that the security 
mechanisms of Windows NT are slightly better than 
those of UNIX. Despite this fact the two systems display 
a similar set of vulnerabilities. This implies that Windows 
NT has the theoretical capacity of being more secure 
than “standard” UNIX. However, with the present way of 
installing and using the system there seems to be no 
significant difference between their security levels. It is 
true that there are presently more intrusions in UNIX 
systems, but the authors believed that this is due to the 
aging factor, i.e. the statement above should hold when 
comparing the systems at the same state of 
development and market penetration.  
Thus, the only reason for more UNIX 
penetrations is that the system is older and more well-
known and we should anticipate an increasing number 
of intrusions into Windows NT, a tendency that has 
already started. It is clear that the Achilles heel of both 
systems is networking. Since both systems utilize the 
same low level protocols, i.e. IP, TCP and UDP, and 
comparable high level protocols. This could to some 
extent explain that the security behavior of both systems 
is similar, but it does not provide the full explanation. 
However, as long as the networking is such a weak 
point, the usefulness of other security mechanisms is 
diminished. 
Jorgen Blakstad, et al [7], in “All in a day's work: 
Password cracking for the rest of us”, Describes that the 
majority of computer systems are still protected primarily 
with a Username and password, and many users 
employ the same password on multiple systems. 
Additionally, some of the most popular operating 
systems such as Windows XP, Windows Vista and the 
upcoming Windows 8, still use ad-hoc constructed hash 
functions such as LM, while many Linux variants use the 
hash function MD5.  
This paper describes an experiment where we 
have tested the strength of a selection of passwords 
when converted to LM, NT and MD5 hashes, 
respectively, using commonly available tools. Our 
conclusion is that a large number of passwords can be 
cracked within a normal working day, and that all LM 
hash passwords can be recovered easily. The use of 
such weak hash functions in the process of user 
authentication in these operating systems poses a 
significant threat to an organization's security. 
III. Conclusion 
The main benefit of Rainbow Tables is that while 
the actual creation of the rainbow tables takes much 
more time than cracking a single hash, after they are 
generated you can use the tables over and over again. 
Once you have generated the Rainbow Tables, Attacks 
using is faster than brute force attacks and needs less 
memory than full dictionary attacks. 
In this paper we have reviewed some of the 
most important works in rainbow table generation and 
using rainbow tables in window NT environment, i.e. 
against NTLM. We have discussed how NTLM is weak 
against rainbow table attacks. 
IV. Future Scope 
Rainbow Tables are popular with particularly 
weak password algorithms such as Microsoft LM and 
NTLM hash, these password algorithms was used in 
earlier days of Windows and still lives on only for 
compatibility reasons.  
A Review of NTLM Rainbow Table Generation Techniques
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In the future we want to devise an experiment 
where we will test the strength of a selection of 
passwords using commonly available tools. This is to 
show that a large number of passwords can be cracked 
within working days and Majority of passwords used 
commonly have very skewed frequency distributions. 
We want to device methodologies based upon 
calculation of frequency distribution algorithm.   
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